The TIT-FOR-TAT strategy is particularly interesting in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. How do a few defectors fare in a society of mostly TIT-FOR-TATers? How do the TIT-FOR-TATers fare? How would a few cooperators fare with the TIT-FOR-TATers? Would the evolution of such a society favor cooperation or defection? Now consider a society of mostly TIT-FOR-TATers. Occasionally, you will deviate from this strategy by playing D. Your first move is to COOPERATE (C), but then you need to repeat your opponent's last move. Your strategy is to play whatever your opponent just played.
Strategy: Tit for Tat with Occasional Surprise D.Your strategy is to COOPERATE (C) randomly \(25\%\) of the time and DEFECT (D) \(75\%\) of the time.
